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Introduction
Investments in next-generation …ber networks have been focal to policy makers'attention, because the high-speed Internet services that rely on these networks are expected to have a signi…cant impact on the society and the economy as a whole (Czernich et al., 2011) . For example, in the European Union (EU), the European Commission (EC) has de…ned speci…c targets for the development of broadband services. 1 However, recent data from the European Commission -DG Infosoc (2012) shows that these targets are at a far reach from the current status of broadband services in the EU, and therefore they can only be met if substantial infrastructure investments take place in the coming years. 2 While policy makers aim at promoting investments in …ber networks, the regulatory tools that they use to achieve other ends, such static e¢ ciency, can be detrimental for such infrastructure investments. In particular, it is often argued that setting too attractive terms of access to the legacy network to promote short-run competition can hinder entrant …rms to invest in their own infrastructure and also reduce the infrastructure owners'incentives to maintain and upgrade their network. 3 Infrastructure investments can be hindered not only by the current regulatory access policies, but also by the (perceived) future regulatory "threats," to the extent that they undermine the …rms'expected returns from investment.
Fine tuning access policies to better address the tensions between di¤erent regulatory objectives is a challenging task, and the policy recommendations made so far by market specialists appear to be in sharp contrast with one another. For example, in a recent report for the European Competitive Telecommunication Association (ECTA), WIK (2011) proposes to decrease the access price to the network lowers the incumbent's incentives to invest, while increasing that of the competing …rm (who does not own a network at the beginning). The investment incentives of the entrants can be ampli…ed even further if the incumbent and the entrants can sign contracts to …x the terms of usage of the new network.
While Inderst and Peitz (2012) consider network investment decisions in a single area (e.g., a country), Bourreau et al. (2012) consider di¤erent geographical areas within a country that di¤er with respect to the cost of rolling out the …ber network. They show that a higher access price to the legacy network fosters the entrant's …rm investments, but that it has an ambiguous e¤ect on the incumbent's investments due to two con ‡icting e¤ects: the wholesale revenue e¤ect, and the retail-level migration e¤ect. A higher access price increases the incumbent's opportunity cost of investment due to the wholesale revenue e¤ ect (if the incumbent invests in a higher quality network, the entrant may invest in reaction, and the incumbent will then lose some wholesale pro…ts). Furthermore, since the copper and …ber networks coexist, higher access prices (which imply high prices for the services provided with the copper network) also imply relatively high prices for the services provided with the …ber networks, increasing the returns from investing in …ber. This retail-level migration e¤ ect works in the opposite direction from that of the wholesale revenue e¤ect, and hence, the net e¤ect is ambiguous. Bourreau et al. show that the regulation of the access price to copper, alone, cannot overcome the tension between di¤erent regulatory objectives, namely, the promotion of static e¢ ciency, fostering investments in new infrastructures, and avoiding unnecessary duplication of (…ber) networks.
While these studies shed light on how the access price to the legacy network may a¤ect investment incentives for the transition from copper to …ber, this single access price turns out to be a rather limited tool, as the authors consider a single (uniform) price for access. Furthermore, these studies consider regulation of access only to the copper network. Regulatory requirements of access to …ber networks is not only a theoretical possibility, but is also hotly debated in several European countries. For example, in France, Germany, Italy, the UK and Spain, access to ducts and (less often) to dark …ber is mandated, while in other countries (such as the Netherlands and Germany) unbundling of …ber networks has been imposed (Cullen International, 2012) .
In this paper we build on Bourreau et al. (2012) and address the following questions. First, can access price discrimination across di¤erent geographical areas resolve the tension between di¤erent regulatory objectives? This is an important question to address, as the latest EU Recommendation on …ber access points to geographically di¤erentiated access remedies as one of the new approaches to be considered. 7 We …nd that setting di¤erent access prices in di¤erent areas according to the …ber network roll-out improves regulatory outcomes, but it does not resolve the tension among di¤erent objectives entirely.
Second, when the …ber network is also subject to ex-ante access regulation, what is the (potential) interplay between the access prices for the copper and …ber networks? 8 We …nd that regulators should not set the access prices to the two infrastructures independently, and that the sign of the correlation between the two prices should depend on which operator-the incumbent or the entrant-is expected to be the leader in …ber roll-out. When the incumbent has a larger …ber coverage than the entrant, the regulator should set an access price to the new infrastructure that is positively correlated with the access price to the legacy network, in order to incentivize both the entrant and the incumbent to invest. However, if the entrant has a larger …ber coverage than the incumbent, the regulator should set a low access price to copper (to level the playing …eld) in the uncovered areas and set a high access price on …ber to foster …rms'investment incentives.
Finally, we extend our analysis to study the case in which the copper network is required to be 7 Directive 2009/140/EC ("Better Regulation Directive", recital 7) explicitly considers the possibility of de…ning di¤erent geographical markets and remedies according to the prevailing competitive conditions. 8 Bourreau et al. (2012) only brie ‡y touches this question within a speci…ed competitive setting.
switched o¤ upon the deployment of …ber, and show that this grants the regulator greater ‡exibility in setting the access price to …ber, because the copper switch-o¤ obligation forces migration to …ber at the wholesale level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the model. In Section 3 we study a benchmark with no access to …ber. We also study the e¤ect of an upgrade of the copper network on investment in …ber, and consider access price discrimination across di¤erent areas as an alternative regulatory tool to uniform pricing. In Section 4 we introduce ex-ante access regulation to the …ber network, and study the interplay between two access prices. We also consider a mandatory switch-o¤ for the copper network. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
The setting
We build on the model provided by Bourreau et al. (2012) , and consider competition between an incumbent operator (…rm 1) and an entrant operator (…rm 2) in the broadband telecommunications market. At the beginning of the game, both …rms rely on the incumbent's copper network to provide broadband services. The entrant leases access to the incumbent's copper network (e.g., through a local loop unbundling o¤er) at the regulated per-unit access price a 0. 9 We assume that the marginal cost of providing access is constant and normalize it to 0.
Both …rms sequentially invest in …ber networks, and we assume that the incumbent makes its investment …rst. 10 When a …rm invests in a …ber network in a given area, it no longer employs the copper network to provide broadband services, that is, in that area the new technology replaces the old one for the …rm in question. A …rm can also ask for access to its rival's …ber infrastructure at the regulated per-unit access price e a 0.
9 The analysis provided by Bourreau et al. (2012) , who do not consider regulation of the …ber network, constitutes our benchmark in this paper. We introduce access to …ber in Section 4.
1 0 This sequence of moves re ‡ects the idea that incumbent …rms may have speci…c advantages in the deployment of the new infrastructure (due to their control over the existing infrastructure).
Investment costs. We consider a country composed of a continuum of areas, with a total size of z. The …xed cost of rolling out the …ber network varies in di¤erent areas of the country, and we order the areas (from 0 to z) so that the ranking re ‡ects the order of the magnitude of NGN investment costs (from low to high).
For each …rm i = 1; 2, the decision to invest in …ber involves setting the areas [0; z i ] in which its …ber network will be rolled out, with [0;
The …xed cost of covering an area at a given location x 2 [0; z] is denoted by c (x), with c (x) > 0 and c 0 (x) > 0, and it is the same for both …rms. The total cost of covering the area [0;
Demand for broadband services. We use the competitive setting provided by Katz and Shapiro (1985) . The indirect utility function of a consumer of type is U = + s i p i , where s i and p i denote the quality and price of …rm i, with i = 1; 2. Consumers' types are uniformly distributed over ( 1; 1]. 11 Firms set quantities, and we normalize marginal costs to zero. We allow …rms to set di¤erent quantities in di¤erent areas depending on their network technology and that of their rival. We use the superscripts "O"and "N "for the old (copper) and new (…ber) networks, respectively. The pro…t of …rm i = 1; 2 in a given area, gross of investment cost, is denoted by k;l i , where k; l = O; N refer to the network technology of the incumbent and the entrant, respectively. We denote by s O and s N the quality of the old copper network and new …ber network, respectively. We assume that s N > s O , and that s N < (1 + 5s O )=4, which ensures the coexistence of both networks in equilibrium (i.e., a …rm using the copper network is not evicted by a …rm using a …ber network), and that the quality di¤erence is not so high that it would be socially e¢ cient to close the low-quality network. Finally, we assume that the access prices to the copper and …ber networks are not too high so that an access seeker always makes a positive pro…t in any local area, gross of investment costs.
The timing. The timing of the game is as follows: The regulator sets the access price on the copper network, a, and on the …ber network, e a (in the benchmark case we consider access to the copper network only). Then, the incumbent decides on the areas in which to roll-out a …ber network, z 1 . Having observed the incumbent's decision, the entrant decides on its own …ber network coverage, z 2 . Finally, …rms compete in quantities.
A benchmark: No access to …ber
We start by studying a benchmark case, where there is no access to …ber. In any given geographical area, depending on the investment decisions of the …rms for that area and on the access requirements set by the regulator, the competitive environment is de…ned by one of the three following con…gurations:
1. Service-based competition within the copper network. Both …rms employ the incumbent's copper network to provide broadband services, and obtain gross pro…ts In our setting, since we limit the quality di¤erence between the copper and …ber networks, con…guration (2) is viable, i.e., the legacy and the new network can coexist in a given area. 12 In what follows, we start by characterizing the equilibrium coverage as a function of the access price to the copper network. Then, we study the potential e¤ects of a quality upgrade of the copper network on investments in …ber. Finally, we discuss the impact of a geographical di¤erentiation of the access price to copper on social welfare.
Equilibrium …ber coverage with no access to …ber
The coverage game without access to …ber is studied in detail in Bourreau et al. (2012) , therefore we just summarize and discuss here the di¤erent equilibria that can emerge in the sequential game.
The pro…ts in the last stage of the game for each industry con…guration (1) to (3) can be found in Appendix A. When the entrant relies on the incumbent's infrastructure to provide its services (i.e., in industry con…gurations (1) and (2.ii)), its pro…t decreases with the access price a, whereas the incumbent's pro…t increases with the access price up to the monopoly access price (which we denote by b a O and b a N , when the incumbent uses the old and new technology, respectively). 13 Finally, the incumbent makes more pro…t when the entrant leases access to the copper network (con…gurations (1) and (2.ii)) than when the entrant uses its own …ber network (con…gurations (2.i) and (3)). 14 In the coverage game, given that the incumbent has covered a certain fraction of a country with …ber, the entrant decides to deploy its own …ber network up to the level that maximizes its total pro…t. Assuming that the incumbent has covered the areas [0; z 1 ], the entrant's pro…t is
The entrant may decide to invest more (i.e., to cover more areas) or less (i.e., to cover less areas) than the incumbent. The incumbent then reacts to the entrant's optimal investment decision by deciding on the coverage that maximizes its own pro…t in both scenarios. This sequential coverage game has two potential asymmetric interior equilibria. 15 In the …rst asymmetric equilibrium, the entrant dominates the …ber market, that is, the entrant reaches a coverage, z m 2 , which is larger than
). In the second asymmetric equilibrium, the incumbent invests more in …ber coverage than the entrant and dominates the …ber market; the incumbent covers z m 1 (a) = (c) 1 (
Bourreau et al. show in a more general setting that the global …ber coverage (which is the total coverage of the …rm that has the largest …ber network coverage) can vary non-monotonically with the access price of the copper network. 16 This result is due to the coexistence of three di¤erent e¤ects: (i) the replacement e¤ ect that hinders infrastructure investment by alternative operators when the access price is low; (ii) the wholesale revenue e¤ ect that discourages the incumbent to invest in a higher quality network when the access price is low (since the entrant may invest in reaction, and the incumbent will then lose some of its wholesale pro…ts); and …nally (iii) the retaillevel migration e¤ ect: when the access price to the copper network is low, the retail prices of the services which rely on the copper network are also low. Therefore, in order to encourage customers to switch from copper to …ber, operators should also o¤er low prices for …ber services. This e¤ect reduces the pro…tability of the …ber infrastructure, and hence, the incentives to invest in it.
In our setting with a speci…c demand system, a higher access price leads locally to higher …ber Bourreau et al. (2012) assume that the quality di¤erence between the old and the next generation networks is …xed. However, recent technologies such as "vectoring" can improve the speed of broadband connections provided on the copper network, and hence reduce the quality advantage of the …ber network. Since in many countries the deployment of the vectoring technology is subject to the regulator's authorization, it is interesting to study how the equilibrium investments in …ber coverage would be a¤ected by an exogenous increase in the quality of the copper network, s O . We have the following result for the two asymmetric equilibria.
Proposition 1 A higher quality of the copper network leads to lower investments in …ber coverage.
Proof. See Appendix C.
1 7 This result is provided as an example by Bourreau et al. (2012) in Lemma 4. 1 8 See also Christodoulou and Vlahous (2001) , Crandall et al. (2004) , Willig (2006) , and Waverman et al. (2007) . Christodoulou and Vlahous (2001) analyze the impact of unbundling rates in a simulated context with a mix of facilities and services competition, and …nd that increasing the access rates promotes investment by both historic operators and entrants. In a similar vein, using data on 15 European countries from 2002 to 2006, Crandall et al. (2004) …nd that access prices that are too low do not encourage new entrants to build their own facilities after gaining market experience. Willig (2006) …nds that a small reduction (1%) in unbundled network elements rates induces a more than proportional increase in the historic operator's investment (2.1% to 2.9%). Waverman et al. (2007) examine the impact of local loop unbundling prices on alternative infrastructures'market share, and …nd that a reduction in the local loop unbundling price causes a more than proportional reduction in the subscribers share of alternative infrastructures.
In our setting, a quality upgrade of the copper network generates the following e¤ects: (i ) the above mentioned replacement and wholesale revenue e¤ects are intensi…ed, as both the incumbent and the entrant make higher pro…ts with the copper network, and (ii ) the pro…tability of …ber is decreased, due to a lower quality advantage of …ber services over copper network services. Both of these e¤ects lead to a reduction of investment incentives, and hence …rms invest in less …ber coverage when the copper network is upgraded.
From a policy perspective, this result suggests that the regulator has to trade o¤ between spurring high-speed broadband services via an upgrade of the copper network or the deployment of …ber infrastructures.
Geographical di¤erentiation of copper access prices
As studied in Bourreau et al. (2012) , when determining the access price to the legacy network, the regulator faces a standard trade-o¤ between static e¢ ciency and investment incentives, but also a trade-o¤ between the social bene…ts of network expansion and the social costs of duplication. A single regulatory instrument (i.e., setting a uniform access price to the legacy network) is insu¢ cient to overcome the tension between the-potentially con ‡icting-three regulatory objectives: (i ) achieving static e¢ ciency in uncovered (or partially covered) areas, (ii ) providing …rms with appropriate investment incentives, and (iii ) setting right the frontier between the areas with two competing …ber infrastructures and the areas with a monopoly …ber infrastructure (i.e., the appropriate level of infrastructure duplication).
One potential solution would be to allow the regulator to set di¤erent access prices for copper, 19 depending on whether there is infrastructure competition between di¤erent technological (copper and …ber) networks. In our framework, this di¤erentiation of access prices matters only when the incumbent dominates NGN investments, and we therefore focus on this case. 20 Let a O and a N denote the access prices for the areas with no …ber network (i.e., con…guration (1)) and with a single …ber network (i.e., con…guration (2) In what follows, we …rst determine the (local) social optimum in terms of coverage and access prices when the incumbent dominates …ber investments, and then study whether the regulator can implement the social optimum with di¤erentiated access prices.
The social optimum when the incumbent dominates …ber investment. Assume that …rm 1 and …rm 2's coverage, z 1w and z 2w , are set by the regulator, together with the di¤erentiated access prices, a O w and a N w , with z 1w z 2w . The subscript "w" stands for the welfare-maximizing solution. The social welfare is given by
Assuming an interior solution, the local social optimum is then obtained when 21
and
Equations (1) and (2) state that the access prices a O w and a N w should be set so as to maximize local welfare in areas of type (1) and (2ii), respectively. Since dw O;O =da O < 0 and dw N;O =da N < 0, and since we have assumed positive access prices, this is achieved when a O w = 0 and a N w = 0 (access prices are bounded at zero, which represents the marginal cost due to our normalization).
Equation (3) states that the total …ber coverage, z 1w , should be set such that welfare in areas with a single …ber infrastructure equates the cost of building this infrastructure plus the opportunity social cost (i.e., local welfare with service-based competition on copper).
Finally, equation (4) means that the coverage of the small network, z 2w , should be set such that the welfare gain of having competition between …ber infrastructures instead of a single …ber infrastructure equates the cost of duplicating infrastructure.
Can di¤erentiated access prices achieve the social optimum? We now determine whether the regulator can implement the social optimum de…ned above with di¤erentiated access prices, when …ber coverage is determined by the market outcome. In this case, for given access prices a O and a N , the social welfare is
The …rst component in (5) represents the welfare in areas with two competing …ber infrastructures.
The second component is the welfare in areas with a single infrastructure and the third term the welfare in areas with no …ber infrastructure.
The two …rst order derivatives of welfare with respect to a O and a N are 22
.
Equation (6) shows that the regulator can set a O to achieve a maximum per-area welfare in uncovered areas (i.e., a O = 0), and then it could set a N to achieve a socially optimal global …ber network coverage (i.e., by choosing a N such that
is, the regulator can solve the con ‡ict between static e¢ ciency in uncovered areas and incentives to invest in a monopoly …ber infrastructure. However, as equation (7) clearly shows, by setting such values for a O and a N , the regulator will not be able to maximize static e¢ ciency in partially covered areas (the last term of the equation) and to set the right incentives to duplicate an existing …ber infrastructure (the …rst term in the equation)-or only by chance. Therefore, geographical di¤erentiation of access prices fails to resolve completely the tension between the three regulatory objectives. We can therefore state the following result.
Proposition 2 When the incumbent dominates …ber investments, di¤ erentiating the copper access 2 2 See Appendix F for the signs of the di¤erent terms in (6) and (7 price in areas with competing …ber infrastructures and areas with a single …ber infrastructure is not enough to achieve the social optimum.
Although geographical di¤erentiation of access prices is not a miracle solution, it outperforms uniform access pricing. Equation (6) suggests that the regulator should set a cost oriented access price to copper in areas with no …ber infrastructure (i.e., a zero access price in our setting due to our normalization), and an above-cost access price to copper network in areas with a …ber infrastructure. At the end of Section 4, we provide a numerical example for di¤erentiated access prices, and compare the market outcome with this access scheme to the outcome with alternative access schemes.
Access to …ber
In many European countries (such as France, Italy, Germany and Spain), access to …ber ducts is mandated and subject to ex ante control. 24 In this section we therefore introduce access to …ber, and analyze the interplay between the regulation of access to the copper network and to the …ber network. We consider a symmetric regulation, where both the incumbent and the entrant are required to provide access to their …ber networks at a regulated price, e a. 25
On top of the three industry con…gurations we have listed in our benchmark case, a fourth con…guration is now possible:
4. Service-based competition within the …ber network. Both …rms use the same …ber network to compete. Depending on the investment decisions, the network can be owned by the incumbent or the entrant, whereby the owner of the network provides access to the other …rm at price e a.
Let e N;N i
(e a) and N;N j (e a) denote …rm i's pro…t when it provides access to its …ber network to …rm j 6 = i and …rm j's pro…t when it leases access to …rm i's …ber network, respectively. We …nd that @e N;N i (e a) =@e a 0 for e a not too high, and that @ N;N j (e a) =@e a 0. 26 In words, provided that the access price of the …ber is not too high, the gross pro…ts of the …rm that owns the …ber network increase with the access price, whereas the opposite is true for the …rm that acquires access.
We assume that the access price for …ber is low enough so that the …rm that invests less in …ber is always willing to switch from copper to …ber at the wholesale level, which we refer to as the "wholesale migration condition". 
is, the regulated access price to the …ber network is not too high, so that there is always access to a monopoly …ber infrastructure (rather than to the copper infrastructure).
We determine the entrant's and the incumbent's optimal investment decisions in Appendix G2.
We now …rst characterize the socially-optimal access price for …ber as a function of the access price for copper. Then, we discuss how a switch-o¤ of the copper network would a¤ect …ber equilibrium coverage.
Socially optimal access price to the …ber network
We analyze the regulator's choice of the access price for …ber, and the relationship between the socially optimal …ber access price and the access price to copper.
If the incumbent dominates …ber coverage, the equilibrium coverage are z 1 = e z m 1 (a; e a) and z 2 = e z c 2 (e a). The social welfare is then In Appendix G3, we show that in this case there is a positive relationship between the socially optimal e a and the access price of the legacy network, i.e., de a w =da 0, if w N;N (e a) w O;O (a)
c (e z m 1 ) 0. 27
On the other hand, if the entrant invests in larger …ber coverage than the incumbent, the equilibrium coverage are z 1 = e z c 1 (e a) and z 2 = e z m 2 (a; e a), and the social welfare is We …nd that the relationship between e a w and a can be reversed, that is, we can have de a w =da 0. 28
The following …gure provides an illustration, when C (z) = kz 2 =2, z = 4, k = 0:3, s O = 1 and s N = 1:4. For low values of the copper access a, the incumbent invests more in equilibrium, and we …nd that the …ber access price increases with a. For higher values of a (but lower than 0.35), it is the entrant that invests more, and e a w decreases with a. 29 2 7 Note that this result holds if the marginal investment cost is convex, and it does not necessarily hold when the marginal investment cost is concave.
2 8 This holds when the marginal investment cost is convex. See Appendix G3 for the formal proofs. 2 9 When a > 0:35, we have a corner (non-interior) equilibrium where the incumbent invests more. In this case, we …nd that e a w …rst increases then decreases with a. The incumbent invests more
The entrant invests more Fig. 1 : Socially-optimal …ber access price as a function of the copper access price
The intuition for this di¤erence between the cases when the incumbent or the entrant dominates investment in …ber is as follows. The copper network access price a¤ects the trade-o¤ for the regulator between setting a high …ber access price, which increases marginally …ber coverage, and setting a low …ber network access price, which limits the deadweight loss in the areas with a monopoly …ber infrastructure. How the copper network access price a¤ects the regulator's tradeo¤ between a low and a high …ber network access price depends on whether it is the incumbent or the entrant that owns the …ber infrastructure subject to access.
When the incumbent owns the monopoly …ber infrastructure, raising the access price to the copper network has three e¤ects, which all gives an incentive to the regulator to increase the …ber access price. First, a higher copper access price reduces the size of the area with a monopoly …ber infrastructure, as it intensi…es the wholesale revenue e¤ect, hence reducing the incumbent's investment incentives. This, in turn, reduces the deadweight loss associated to a high …ber access price in the areas with the monopoly …ber network.
Second, a higher copper access price reduces welfare in the areas not covered by a …ber network.
Hence, the regulator has an incentive to expand the areas covered with …ber, and to reduce the uncovered areas where retail prices tend to increase. Third, the frontier between the uncovered areas and the areas with a monopoly …ber infrastructure becomes more sensitive to the …ber access price; this also gives an incentive to the regulator to increase the …ber access price to encourage investment. All in all, when the incumbent is the "leader" in the deployment of …ber, the socially optimal access price to …ber is positively related to the copper access price.
When the entrant owns the monopoly …ber infrastructure, a higher copper access price increases the entrant's investment incentives because the replacement e¤ect is softened. Since the size of the areas with the monopoly …ber network increases, the regulator has an incentive to lower the …ber access price to reduce the deadweight loss in these areas. At the same time, the marginal gain of rolling out a …ber network in uncovered areas can either increase or decrease, which gives the incentive to the regulator to either increase or decrease the …ber access price.
Finally, the frontier between the uncovered areas and the areas with a monopoly …ber network becomes less sensitive to the …ber access price, which gives an incentive to the regulator to decrease this price. In sum, when the copper access price increases, the regulator should either lower or increase the …ber access price. Hence, the relation between the socially optimal …ber access price and the copper access price can be negative, when the entrant is the "leader"in …ber investments.
Comparing di¤erent access schemes. Finally, we analyze how the di¤erent access schemes that we have considered in this paper (uniform access price, di¤erentiated access prices, copper and …ber access prices) compare in terms of equilibrium coverage and welfare. The following table gives the equilibrium coverage and welfare for the following parameter values, z = 4, k = 0:3, s O = 1, and for various values of s N (that satisfy our assumptions). 30 The table shows that …ber coverage and welfare are lower with a uniform access price than with a more sophisticated access scheme (di¤erentiated access prices, or access to …ber on top of access to copper). This is because, with a uniform access price, the regulator is very much constrained in setting the uniform access price: it has to be low enough in the areas with an incumbent …ber infrastructure for the entrant to have a positive pro…t in these areas. The regulator therefore cannot use it to spur investment. This constraint is lifted when there is access price di¤erentiation (either geographical di¤erentiated access prices or …ber access). Having di¤erentiated access prices provides the regulator with greater ‡exibility in setting the access terms, which increases investment and welfare substantially. In our simulations, the best scenario in terms of global coverage and welfare is with access to …ber. Fiber access turns out to be a more powerful instrument than geographical di¤erentiation of access, because the former access scheme operates also when the entrant invests more in …ber than the incumbent.
Finally, note that we cannot have di¤erentiated access prices together with …ber access. When there is access to …ber, there is no access to the copper network in an area where the incumbent has invested in …ber while the entrant has not. In this case, indeed, the entrant uses …ber access rather than copper access (i.e., migration takes place at the wholesale level).
Switching o¤ the legacy network
So far, we have considered that the incumbent can continue to provide access to its copper network, while providing its services over a higher quality …ber network (industry con…guration (2.ii)). In some European countries, however, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, there is an on-going debate on whether the incumbents that move from copper to …ber should be imposed to "switch o¤" their legacy network, i.e., to provide access to their higher quality …ber network only.
In order to study the e¤ect of switching o¤ the copper network, we focus on the candidate equilibrium where the incumbent invests more than the entrant, and has to provide access to its …ber network in the areas where the entrant has not rolled out a …ber network (industry con…guration (4) with incumbent's dominance). 31
In our setting, switching o¤ the copper network has mainly an e¤ect on the wholesale migration condition, which becomes
(e a) 0. Due to the switch-o¤ of the copper network, if the entrant does not acquire access to …ber, it earns zero pro…t. Therefore, as switching o¤ the copper network forces the migration at the wholesale level, the regulator has greater ‡exibility for setting the …ber access price. However, the rest of our analysis applies, and in particular, the relation between the socially optimal …ber access price and the copper access price remains the same.
This paper studies the e¤ect of access regulation on the incentives to migrate from the legacy (copper) networks to the next generation (…ber) networks. We build on our companion paper (Bourreau et al., 2012) to address new and policy relevant regulatory issues. More speci…cally,
we analyze the e¤ect of three di¤erent kinds of regulatory measures: First, geographical access regulation of copper networks -where access prices to copper are di¤erentiated depending on whether or not an alternative …ber network has been deployed; second, access obligations on …ber networks and its interplay with wholesale copper prices; and, …nally, a mandatory switch-o¤ of the legacy copper network to foster the transition on the higher quality …ber network.
We show that when setting the access price to the legacy network, the regulator must take into account potential con ‡icts between investment incentives, static e¢ ciency in uncovered areas, and excessive duplication of infrastructure costs. Introducing di¤erent copper network access prices for uncovered areas and partially covered areas (i.e., with a single …ber network), instead of using a simple uniform access regime all over a country, solves some of these con ‡icts, but not all.
We also point out the e¤ects that emerge when both the old and the new infrastructures are subject to ex ante intervention. Interestingly, our results highlight that regulators cannot treat the access prices to the two di¤erent technologies independently. When the incumbent has larger …ber coverage than the entrant, the regulator has to set an access price to the new infrastructure that is positively correlated with the access price to the legacy network. Hence, if the regulator wants to keep the access prices to the copper network relatively low, in order to favor migration at wholesale level (and in turn at the retail level), it also must set a relatively low access price to the …ber network. Whereas the reverse can be true if the entrant has larger …ber coverage than the incumbent: given the relative advantage the incumbent enjoys due to its control over the legacy network, it could be socially optimal for the regulator to set a low access price to the copper network to "level" the playing …eld between the two competitors in the uncovered areas, but also to set a higher access price to the …ber infrastructure controlled by the entrant in order to incentivize investment by both the entrant and the incumbent. This interplay remains unchanged even if the regulator introduces a mandatory switch-o¤ of the copper network to foster migration at the wholesale level.
In policy terms, our result suggests that to the extent that the access price to the legacy network a¤ects investments in …ber by both the incumbent and the entrant, the regulation of access to …ber should be somehow asymmetric, that is, access prices to incumbents'and entrants'…ber networks should be set following di¤erent principles, according to the relative market position (in terms of …ber coverage) of each competitor.
An interesting extension of our analysis might be the introduction of competition between ultra-fast networks at both the retail and the wholesale level, due to the presence for example of alternative access technologies such as cable TV, as it happens in some European countries as Belgium and Switzerland. The existence of a technological bypass can a¤ect the way in which a regulator sets access prices to copper and …ber networks. Investors might also be non-pro…t companies: in several countries, the main investors in NGANs are state-owned companies, in competition or in cooperation with the incumbent operator. This for example happens in Australia, New Zealand and in Italy. The role of state ownership on the migration to ultra-fast broadband networks is relevant per se, but we leave this analysis -as well as the previous one -to future research.
Appendix A: Per-area pro…ts
We denote by s 1 and s 2 the qualities o¤ered by …rm 1 and …rm 2, respectively, with s i 2 s O ; s N , for i = 1; 2. We provide below the equilibrium per-area pro…ts in the four possible industry con…gurations.
(1) Service-based competition within the copper network. 
(2) Infrastructure-based competition between the copper and the …ber networks.
i. The incumbent uses its copper network and the entrant uses its own …ber net- (a) increases with a for all a a N , we have
We study the e¤ect of a higher quality for the copper network, s O , on …rms'investment in …ber.
We focus on the two asymmetric equilibria, fz m 2 ; z c 1 g if the entrant dominates in NGN investment, and fz m 1 ; z c 2 g if it is the incumbent that dominates. We …nd that z c 1 , z m 1 , z m 2 , and z c 2 decrease with the quality of the copper network, s O . Indeed, 
Appendix E: Equilibrium coverage with di¤erentiated copper access prices
We begin by determining the entrant's optimal investment decision for a given coverage set by the incumbent, and then we solve for the coverage equilibrium. 2 is a second-degree polynomial with an inverted bell-shape, and we have @ 2 =@a N a N =0
< 0
and 2 a N = 0 < 0. Besides, we have 2 a N = a N < 0. Therefore, 2 < 0 always holds, and 
